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Projections suggest that the working-age population 
in Spain will age over the course of the next 30 years 
and shrink continuously from the mid-2020s onwards. 
The decline is expected to reach almost 12% between 
2020 and 2050 (see Fig. 1). This will attenuate the coun-
try’s overall economic productivity and have considera-
ble consequences for overall economic development. 
This overview shows how demographic aging (the 
scenario “projected population”) in Spain until 2050 
will affect key macroeconomic indicators, compared 
to a scenario in which the population remains constant 
at the level of 2018 (the baseline “constant population 
(2018)”). 
The negative effects of demographic aging are ex-
pected to attenuate the growth of labor productivity 
until 2050. The difference between the scenario “pro-
jected population” and the baseline scenario should 
increase from around 1,2 euros per hour worked in 
2030 to 2,8 euros in 2040 and almost 4,1 euros in 
2050 (in 2010 prices) (see Fig. 2).  
Since the working-age population is expected to con-
tinue to grow until the end of the 2020s, the growth of 
the real gross domestic product (GDP) in the scenario 
“projected population” should be even stronger until 
2030 than it is in the baseline scenario (+4 billion euros, 
in 2010 prices). Subsequently, however, it is expected 
to be significantly attenuated by demographic aging, 
to 5.6% in 2040 and to more than 12% in 2050 in com-
parison with the baseline scenario (see Fig. 3). In ab-
solute terms, demographic aging and its negative ef-
fects are expected to attenuate GDP by more than 80 
billion euros in 2040 and over 200 billion euros Euro in 
2050 (in 2010 prices). 
With respect to real GDP per capita, which is in effect 
the average material prosperity per inhabitant, this is 
expected to result in the following: In 2030 it will amount 
to 750 euros lower than if the demographic aging of the 
coming decades had not taken place. In 2040 it will be 
lower by around 3,400 euros and in 2050 by about 
6,500 euros (in 2010 prices) (see Fig. 4). 
In the baseline scenario, the savings rate remains vir-
tually unchanged until 2050 (see Fig. 5). Demographic 
change will bring about a sharp rise in the number of 
people of retirement age and a simultaneous decline 
in the working-age population. This will lead to a 
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Figure 1  Historic and expected development of working-age 
                population (aged between 15-64 years), 1980- 2100 
Quelle: UNO - Department of Economic and social Affairs, Eurostat database. 
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FIGURE 2  Productivity per hour worked  
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 3  Potential output  
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 4  Potential output per capita 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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significant decline in the savings rate in the coming 
decades. The drop is expected to amount to 3 per-
centage points – or nearly 14% – between 2018 and 
2040, and to more than 4 percentage points (or about 
18%) by 2050. In 2040, it should be lower by 3.5 per-
centage points than it would be without demographic 
aging, and by 4.6 percentage points in 2050. 
This will also reduce the supply of domestic capital and 
thus the scope for domestic investment (see Fig. 6). 
The investment ratio should drop by almost 2 percent-
age points (or almost 9%) between 2018 and 2040, 
and by almost 2.5 percentage points (or 11%) be-
tween 2018 and 2050. In 2040 and 2050, the invest-
ment ratio is expected to be 2.7 and 2.5 percentage 
points lower than in the baseline scenario. However, 
in an open economy, the domestic capital supply can 
be supplemented by capital inflows from abroad. 
The simulation calculations also confirm the theoretical 
assumption of rising inflationary pressure due to demo-
graphic aging (see Fig. 7). In 2040, the inflation rate in 
the scenario “projected population” is expected to be 
1.4 percentage points above the baseline scenario; in 
2050, the difference is about 2 percentage points.  
The declining savings rate and a simultaneously rising 
consumption rate, due to the growing share of pension-
ers, are in turn expected to lead to an increase in do-
mestic consumption, which means that fewer goods 
and services will be available for export. The rising price 
level, due to the growing inflation rate, in turn means 
that foreign demand for domestic goods tends to de-
cline. Fig. 8 reflects the expected decline of the current 
account surplus in Spain due to aging. It is projected to 
decline from about 2% of GDP to 0.8% of GDP between 
2018 and 2040, and to 0.2% of GDP by 2050. Neverthe-
less, the current account balance is expected to remain 
positive.  
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FIGURE 5  Gross domestic saving 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 6  Gross fixed capital formation 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 7  Consumer price inflation rate 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 8  Current account balance 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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